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AMERICAN RIGHTS IN THE BEHRING SEA.
The Behring Sea controversy includes two qilestions-the
one of fact, the other of law.. First, is the suppression of un-
authorized sealing in Behring Sea necessary for the preserva-
tion of our seal fishery? Second, if such suppression is ne-
cessary, have the United States the right to suppress it at'.
points more than three miles from land?
The facts adduced by Mr. Blaine in his letter of January
22, 189o, to Sir Julian Pauncefote, that the fur seals have
been exterminated in every part of the world except Behring
Sea, and that the wanton destruction of seals in that Sea by
Canadian vessels during the last four years, has reduced the
product of the fishery by forty per centum, would seem to be
conclusive evidence that the first question must be answered
in the affirmative.
Assuming then, that the suppression of sea fishing forseals
in Behring Sea, is necessary for the preservation of the seals,
let us dk-rs the legal question whether the United States
have the r8iht to stop such fishing. The English claim is,
that, at the distance of three marine miles from land, the
jurisdiction of the United States over foreign vessels abrupt-
ly ends, that beyond that limit a vessel flying the British flag
may with impunity commit any act short of actual piracy.
The American position is, that ownership of the land on
which seals make their home, carries with it the right to
protect them from wanton destruction, even beyond the three-
mile belt.
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I.
Whether the open sea is susceptible of ownership, is a
'question which has perplexed jurists and drawn nations into
war. In 16o9, Grotius published his celebrated treatise De
Mare Libero, in which he endeavored to prove, both by
argument and authority, that the sea, being the common
-heritage of all, could not become the property of any one
nation. The opposite view was ably maintained by Selden,
in his Mare ClaZsum, published in 1635. Since then the
-controversy has been carried on by the different writers on
international law, the old arguments and the old authorities
being gone over again and again, without producing unani-
mity of opinion.
Nor has the conduct of the different governments been any
more harmonious than the writings of the jurists. The
-right to appropriate part or all of the sea has been affirmed
-)or denied as suited the interest of each particular nation.
Thus England has always claimed supremacy over the seas
:surrounding her coasts, even when Van Tromp sailed the
English Channel with a broom at his masthead, while dur-
ing the Napoleonic wars, she denied the right of the Baltic
powers to maintain the neutrality of the Baltic sea.
Out of this chaos of conflicting arguments and inconsistent
claims, there has been evolved the rule that each maritime
nation has the right of exclusive jurisdiction over some part
of the open sea adjoining its coasts. But how far that juris-
diction extends, has not been exactly determined. The
rule is stated by different writers to rest on two different
principles that have no necessary connection wit_, a6h other.
One is, that the jurisdiction shall extend only so far as its
exercise may be enforced from land, that is to say, the dis-
tance of a cannon shot from theshore-conventionally spoken
of as three marine miles, though modem ordinance have a
range of thrice that distance. This is the principle on which
England wishes to limit our jurisdiction in Behring Sea.
The other principle is, that the jurisdiction shall extend so
:Far as is necessary for the due protection of the rights of the
-nation and its citizens.
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In most cases the three-mile limit is sufficient for all pur-
poses, and it has therefore been adopted and enforced in
numberless instances, and has acquired the sanction of long
established usage. But where, as in case of the seal fishery,
police powers must be exercised outside the three-mile limit
in order to be effective, it becomes necessary to determine
which of these two principles should prevail.
As there is no godd reason for asserting jurisdiction, unless
a necessity for its exercise exists, it seems to follow logically
that the extent of the jurisdiction should be measured by the
necessity which created it. And when we remember that
in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, this jurisdiction is en-
forced not by means of cannon on shore but by means of
cannon on board of ships, the reason of the three-mile limit
seems to have but an unsubstantial foundation. Cessante
ratione legis, cessac ibsa lex. t,
The doctrine that sea jurisdiction is coterminous with the
necessity, has been distinctly recognized and adopted by
Great Britain. Thus in the preamble to an act of Parlia-
ment passed in 1878 (41 and 42 Vict. c. 73), it is stated
that-
The rightful jurisdiction of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, ex-
tends and always has extended over the open seas adjacent to the coasts of
the United Kingdom and of all other parts of Her Majesty's dominions to
such a distance as is necessary for the defense and security of such do-
minions.
It has also the authority of eminent jurists. It is said by
Chancellor KZNT:-
It is difficult to draw any precise or determinate conclusion, amidst the
variety of opinions, as to the distance to which a State may lawfully ex-"
tend its exclusive dominion over the sea adjoining its territories. All
that can be reasonably asserted is that the dominion of the sovereign of
the shore over the contiguous sea extends as far as is requisite for his safety
and for some lawful end: i Kent Com. w;'29.
The same doctrine is thus laid down by Mr. Chitty
It is not easy to determine to what distance a nation may extend its
rights over the sea by which it is surrounded. Bodinuis pretends that,
according to the common right of maritime nations, the Prince's dominion
extends to the distance of thirty leagues from the coast. But between na-
tion and nation, all that can reasonably be said is, that in general the do-
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minion of the State over the neighboring sea extends as far as her safety
renders it necessary and her power is able to enforce it: I Chitty Com.
Law 99.
In Wharton's Digest of International Law, section 32, we
find this statement:-
The limitation to three miles of the marine belt is based in part on
treaty and in part on customary law. It does not of itself preclude the
sovereign of the shore from exercising police jurisdiction over any de-
structive agencies, which, no matter at what distance from the shore, may
inflict direct injury on the shore, or its territorial -waters.
In the case of Czurch. v. Z-lubbarl (I8O4), 2 Cranch (6
U. S.) 234, Chief Justice MARSHALL laid down the law as
follows-
To reason from the extent of protection a nation will afford to foreigners
to the extent of the means it may use for its own security, does not seem
to be perfectly correct. The seizure of a vessel -within the range of its
c-annon by a foreign force, is an invasion of its territory and is a hostile
act, -which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from in-
jury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. In dif-
ferent seas and on different coasts a wider or more contracted range in
which to exercise the vigilance of the government will be assented to.
It is to be remembered that this statement was not made
in defense of the seizure of a foreign vessel by our govern-
ment, but of the seizure of an American vessel on the high
seas by a foreign power, so that the language used could not
have been dictated by national prejudice.
The doctrine laid down in Church v. Hubbarl has been
acted on by both the United States and England. The
British " hovering act," passed in 1736, (9 Geo. II, c. 35)
assumed- for revenue purposes, a jurisdiction of four leagues
from the coast, by prohibiting foreign goods from being
transshipped within that distance without payment of duties;
and Congress in 1799 enacted that-
The officers of the revenue cutters shall go on board all vessels which
arrive in the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof,
if bound for the United States, and search and examine the same * *
* and shall remain on board such vessels until they arrive at the port or
place of their destination: Rev. Stat. 2760.
The former act has been repealed by Parliament, but the
right to enforce it has never been aisclaimed, and was ex-
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pressly asserted by Sir WILLIAM ScoTT, afterward Lord
STOWELL, in the case of Le Louis (1817) 2 Dods. Ad. 245.
In another way, too, has England asserted jurisdiction be-
yond the three-mile belt. The pearl fisheries of Ceylon,
which extend from sixteen to twenty miles from shore, have
been repeatedly leased by the British government and are
now conducted by the government itself (Encyclopaedia
Britannica, vol. 5, p. 364) and its title to these fisheries is
maintained by English jurists: Chitty Com. Law 98.
So that if the decisions of Lord STOWELL and of Chief
Justice MARSHALL and the writings of Chancellor EN 'r
and of Mr. CHITY, are authority, and if the -practice of the
English as well as of the American government counts for
anything, then the doctrine that a nation may, when ne-
cessary for its own protection, exercise jurisdiction beyond
the conventional three-mile limit, must be taken to be a
firmly established principle of international law, as that law
is understood both in the United States and in England.
II.
In an English review of Wharton's Digest of International
Law, contained in the Law Magazine and Review for
November, 1889, it is said that it appears from the well sus-
tained identity of language, held by former Presidents and
Secretaries of State, that the historical tradition of the United
States is in favor of that absolute freedom of the sea outside
the three-mile belt which is contended for by the British
government in regard to the seal fishery. This statement
needs modification. If we examine the utterances of our
Secretaries of State from JEFFERSON to BLAINE we will find
that while accepting the three-mile limit .as the ordinary
rule for ordinary purposes, they recognize the fact that the
rule has its exceptions, or rather its qualifications. Let us
look at the record.
In 1793, Mr. JEFFERSON, then Secretary of State, wrote
to the French Minister:-
The greatest distance to which any respectable assent among nations
has been at any time given, has been the extent of the human sight, esti-
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mated at upwards of twenty miles, and the smallest distance, I believe,
claimed by any nation whatever, is the utmost range of a cannon ball,
usually stated at one sea league. The character of our coast, remarkable
in considerable parts of it for admitting no vessels of size to pass near the
shores, would entitle us in reason, to as broad a margin of protected navi-
gation as any nation whatever.
Thus, at the outset of our diplomatic history, the principle
that the extent of a nation's jurisdiction over the ocean varies
according to circumstances, was distinctly recognized.
In 1807, Mr. MADISON, while Secretary of State under
JEFFERSON, in instructing the American Ministers at the
Court of St. James, wrote as follows:
There could surely be no pretext for allowing less than a marine league
from the shore, that being the narrowest allowance found in any authori-
ties on the law of nations. If any nation can fairly claim a greater ex-
tent, the United States have pleas which cannot be rejected; and if any
nation is more particularly bound by its own example not to control our
claim, Great Britain must be so by the extent of her own claims to juris-
diction on the seas which surround her.
In 1863, when the United States resisted the claim of
Spain to jurisdiction over the sea within six marine miles of
the shore of Cuba, Mr. SEWARD admitted by implication
that the jurisdictional limit might be varied by circumstances,
for, after asserting the general doctrine of a three-mile belt,
he adds :-
The undersigned is far from intimating that these facts furnish conclus-
ive reasons for denying the claim a respectful consideration. On the con-
trary, he very cheerfully proceeds to consider a farther argument, derived,
as mr. TA9SARA supposes, from reason and justice, which he has urged
in respect to the claim. *This ground is, that the shore of Cuba is, by
reasons of its islets and smaller rocks, such as to require that the maritime
jurisdiction of Cuba, in order to purposes of effective defense and police,
should be extended to the breadth of six miles.
Mr. SEWARD then proceeds to discuss the question of fact,
whether the physical conditions of the Cuban coasts are
such as to ,require an extension of the ordinary maritime
jurisdiction. The claim of Spain is rejected by him, not be-
cause the argument by which it was defended was invalid,
but because the assumed facts on which that argument rested
did not exist.
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In 1886, Mr. BAYARD, in discussing the right of fishing
in the Atlantic Ocean, after asserting the steady adherence
of the United States to the doctrine of the three-mile limit
adds :-
It is true that there are qualifications to this rule.
From these quotations it may be seen, that while the
United States have uniformly asserted, in no uncertain tones,
their jurisdiction over the water within the three-mile belt
adjoining their coasts, they have repeatedly admitted that
the rule may be so qualified by the necessities of the case as
to warrant the exercise of territorial jurisdiction beyond that
limit. So that our present claim is not a departure from
our traditional policy, as English writers on this subject de-
clare, but is merely the assertion of a right which we have
never denied, but which we have seldom been called upon
to affirm.
1I1.
Hitherto we have considered the question under the gen-
eral rules of international law. But there are circumstances
which give us peculiar rights in Behring Sea, and we can
fairly claim jurisdiction over its waters within one hundred
miles from land by virtue of immemorial use with the tacit
consent of Great Britain.
It is admitted by VAT'EL, a strenuous advocate of the
freedom of the sea, that the exclusive right of navigation or
fishery in the sea, may be gained by one nation on the
ground of immemorial use and lost by others by non-user,
when such non-user assumes the nature of a consent or tacit
agreement: Droi des Gens, book i, ch. 23, §§ 279-286.
This is indeed the foundation of all title to territorial juris-
diction whether on land or sea.
That our right to jurisdiction in Behring Sea outside the
three-mile belt has this foundation, is matter of history.
In 1799, the Emperor PAUL, of Russia, asserted Russia's
jurisdiction over Behring Sea, and the coast of North
America down to the fifty-fifth degree of North latitude-
AMERICAN RIGHTS IN THE BEHRING SEA.
This claim, so far as I have been able to learn, was never dis-
puted. In 1821, the Emperor ALEXANDERR reiterated his
father's claim, but instead of confining his jurisdiction to the
bounds named in the ukase of 1799, he claimed, in addition
to Behring Sea, all the land and water lying North of a line
drawn due East from the Southern extremity of the Aleutian
Islands in latitude 510, thus taking in the entire coast of
North America down to a point not far from the present
Northern boundary of the State of Washington, and all that
part of the ocean lying East of Behring Sea. To appreciate
the difference between the claim asserted in 1799 and that
put forward in 1821, we must remember that the curve of
the Aleutian Archipelago forming the Southern boundary
of Behring Sea, swings so far to the South that the Southern-
most island of the group, in latitude 510, lies due West of
Vancouver's Island, and that while Behring Sea is a body of
water having well defined boundaries, being cut off from the
Pacific Ocean -by the chain of the Aleutian Islands, the water
East of Behring Sea is part of the Pacific Ocean with nothing
but an imaginary line to separate it from the rest of the
ocean. The United States protested against this unwarranted
extension of Russian territory, asserted their right of navigat-
ing the Pacific Ocean, denied Russia's title to control the
ocean, and obtained a treaty from Russia conceding freedom
of navigation in the North Pacific. But neither the United
States nor England ever denied Russia's claim to jurisdiction
,over Behring Sea or objected to her exercise thereof. In
1825, Great Britain entered into a treaty with Russia, in
which freedom of navigation in the North Pacific was con-
.ceded and the boundary line between Russian and British
America was defined, but in which no provision was inserted
-which in any way modified or denied Russia's claim ofjuris-
,diction over Behring Sea. It is also noteworthy that while
England reserved the right of navigating to their mouths all
rivers rising in her territory and flowing through the Rus-
sian possessions into the Pacific Ocean, no such right was
reserved as to the great Yukon River, a stream eighteen
hundred miles long, which rises in British territory and
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empties into Behring Sea. Why was not the right of navi-
gating this river reseived by England unless because Behring
Sea, into which it flows, was recognized as Russian prop-
erty?
In 1867, Russia ceded Alaska to the United States, and
with it transferred all her rights in that part of Behring- Sea
lying within the ceded territory. And until 1886, no at-
tempt was made by the subjects or Great Britain to hunt
seals in Behring Sea. In view of these facts, it does not
seem strange that the British government has found no ade-
quate answer to Mr. Blaine's question:-
Whence did the ships of Canada derive the right to do in 1886 that which
they had refrained from doing for nearly ninety years?
The Russian ukase of 1821 did not wholly close Behring
Sea against the ships of foreign nations, but it did forbid all
foreign ships from approaching within one "hundred miles
of the shore, a regulation which subsequent experience has
shown to be necessary to preserve the seals from extermina-
tion. Both the United States and Great Britain recognized,
respected and obeyed this ukase as long as Alaska remained
Russian property. For nineteen years after the session to
the United States, England did not infringe its restrictions.
That it was a wise regulation is shown by the fact that it has
secured the preservation of the seal fishery. That it was a
just one, is shown by the fact that it was universally ac-
quiesced in for nearly ninety years. That it was a lawful
one under the principles of international law, it has been the
object of this article to prove. If it is wise, just and lawful,
it is clearly the duty of the United States to enforce it.
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